This paper investigates the distinct effects of the use of information technology and communication technology in firms on the degree of delegation of decision making. This paper contributes to the literature on organization design by showing empirically that these two types of technology have distinct effects on delegation at the level of analysis of delegation from manager to employees: delegation is more likely when database software is used and it is less likely when communication software is employed. We use a longitudinal and nationally representative dataset from Statistics Canada?s Workplace and Employee Survey to test the theory. 
INTRODUCTION
Delegation of decision authority is a key organizational mechanism through which firms pool the resources of authority and specialized knowledge for decision making (Aghion & Tirole, 1997) . Delegation has been shown to be instrumental for speedy decision making (Lin & Germain, 2003; Patacconi, 2009) , for firms' adaptation in dynamic environments (Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2010; Mendelson, 2000) , and for utilizing specialized knowledge that is embedded in multiple individuals in the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1992) . Prior research found that the design of delegation of authority over decisions is complementary to other organizational practices (Foss, Laursen, & Pedersen, 2011) and is facilitated by the application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Most of prior empirical research on the relationship between ICT in the context of organization design aggregated ICT technologies together into one measure of ICT capital, computers per person, or implementation of network technology for sharing technical data (see e.g. Colombo & Delmastro, 2004) . Recent research, both theoretical (Garicano, 2000) and empirical (Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, Reenen, & John, 2013) , however, demonstrates that information technology (IT) and communication technology (CT) should be considered separately, as they have distinct effects on delegation.
This paper draws on a model of Garicano (2000) which implies that information technology, such as the use of database software or enterprise resource planning systems reduces the cost of information acquisition at lower organizational levels. Consequently, it acts as a decentralizing force, as it allows agents to make decisions based on easily available relevant knowledge. On the other hand, communication technology, such as the use of network systems, email or intranets, reduces the cost of communication between the manager and worker, therefore facilitates management by exception and is a centralizing force (Garicano, 2000; Bloom et al. 2013 ). To date one empirical study (Bloom et al. 2013 ) has documented these relationships using a large dataset of about 1000 manufacturing firms across several countries by showing that these opposing effects are observed when headquarters delegate decision authority to business units. While that was the first empirical test of the theory developed by Garicano (2000) , Bloom et al. have not found an empirical evidence of this mechanism at the level of delegation from divisional managers to employees. The present paper fills this gap.
The purpose of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence on the distinct effects of IT and CT on delegation of decision authority using the longitudinal workplace (establishment) level data from Statistics Canada's Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). Our regression sample contains 12,328 workplace-year observations in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 from different manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Similar to the data set used by Bloom et al. (2014) , WES contains detailed information on both the use of different types of ICT applications within a workplace and its decision structure. But on top of this, WES also contains longitudinal information on both organizational structure and ICT use, and it is representative of various sectors across Canada. Therefore, panel data regression analysis of this data set allows us to examine the distinct effect of information and communication technology at the level of analysis of delegation from manager to worker, therefore our findings are complementary to the results of Bloom et al. (2013) in a way that they corroborate the mechanisms at a more granular level of analysis.
Our contribution to the literature on delegation and organizational design is threefold. First, we join the very few studies that distinguish between IT and CT and their impact on organizational design. Second, we empirically demonstrate significant, distinct effects of these two types of ICT on delegation at the level of analysis of delegation from manager to workers. Third, we test this relationship on a dataset which is generalizable across industries and hasn't been used to test this relationship before. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we explain the theory behind the distinct effects of IT and CM on delegation. Then we describe our data, report the results and robustness checks. Finally, we discuss or results and provide conclusions.
THEORY: THE DISTINCT EFFECTS OF ICT ON DELEGATION
Organizational design of allocation of decision authority between managers and workers is concerned with a tradeoff between the cost of decision makers acquiring decision-relevant knowledge (the cost of information acquisition), and communication cost between managers and workers (Garicano, 2000) . Granting autonomy and decision authority to front line employees requires investments in their human capital e.g. through training (Lepak & Snell, 1999; Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009 ) and facilitation of access to decision-relevant information.
If acquiring decision-relevant knowledge is expensive, knowledge of frontline workers can be substituted for by the knowledge of their superiors, who typically have greater work experience, expertise and problem solving skills. While such centralized organizational solution reduces the cognitive burden of workers and reduces the cost of information acquisition by workers, it increases the intensity and cost of communication between workers and managers, as workers ask for managerial directions frequently. On the other hand, reduction in cost of vertical communication allows for "management by exception", in which case workers solve routine problems and make routine decisions, but when exceptions occur, they communicate the problem upwards where it is solved at higher levels, and the firm can economize on the cost of acquiring additional information at lower levels. In this way decentralized organizations trade off "knowing" by the workers vs. asking superiors for directions (Garicano, 2000; Bloom et al., 2013) .
Reduction of information acquisition cost and delegation
The main benefits of decentralization arise from the ability to utilize distributed knowledge (Hayek, 1945; Jensen & Meckling, 1992) and reducing the need for information processing at the top of the hierarchy (Mintzberg, 1979) . Reduction in the cost of accessing information at the lower hierarchy levels enables lower level workers to make qualified decisions independently, and thus increases workers' autonomy. This reduces the cognitive burden of managers, since workers don't need to ask for managers' directions. We are interested in the use of database software which provides workers with a wide range of real time, factual information about products, inventory levels, or other information relevant for performing task at hand, which allows employees to obtain accurate information, to solve wide range of problems and make informed decisions without asking the superior for help. Thus, the use of database software should increase the extent of delegation of decisions from managers to workers.
Hypothesis 1. Delegation is more likely when database software is used.

The effect of communication technology on delegation
When workers encounter non routine problems or lack sufficient knowledge for decision-making, they seek advice from the managers (Garicano, 2000) . In the model of Garicano (2000) , communication cost approximates such "helping cost" -the cost of a manager helping an employee to solve a problem. Communication cost is incurred per question asked.
Communication technology, such as wired and wireless communications, e-mail, network technologies, or mobile devices, makes communication between the manager and worker easier, faster and less costly, thereby workers can refer unusual, non-routine problems upwards to their superiors at low cost. 
DATA
Workplace and Employee Survey
We use the data from Statistics Canada's Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) for empirical analysis. WES is a longitudinal linked employer-employee data set containing employer information (from the Workplace Survey) and employee information (from the Employee Survey).
WES has several unique features for examining the relationship between ICT use and decentralization. First, the workplaces in WES are drawn from a nationally representative sample from different industries allowing us to evaluate whether the observed empirical patterns reported in Bloom et al. (2013) are specific to a particular set of industries. Second, WES provides detailed information on the decision structure within the workplace, in particular, whether decision rights are decentralized from the top to the bottom. It also allows us to identify whether database and communication applications, among other types of ICT applications, are used within the workplace. Third, the data set contains other workplace-level measures which can be used to control for other factors that may affect the decentralization decision of the workplace. Its longitudinal nature also allows me to control for the unobserved heterogeneity at the workplace level.
Nevertheless, since the unit of observation in the Workplace Survey is a workplace with a fixed address, a major limitation of WES is that we only observe the structure of a certain part of an organization (unless the sampled workplace is a single-location firm), and there is no direct information to infer whether two workplaces in the sample are within the same organization (such as two local branches of the same bank). As a result, we cannot study the interaction between different units of the same organization (such as the delegation of decision authority from the headquarters to the local plants, as in Bloom et al., 2013) .
Definition of Variables
Dependent and independent variables.
Delegation. From the Workplace Survey, we can observe whether various work-related activities (such as daily or weekly planning of individual work, recruitment, and choice of production technology, etc.) can be decided by "Non-managerial employees," "Work group," "Work supervisor," "Senior manager," "Individual or group outside workplace," and "Business owner."1 In the empirical analysis, we define "workers" as "Non-managerial employees" or "Work group," and "managers" as "Work supervisor," "Senior manager," or "Business owner."
For each decision, we can observe the following three cases:
1. Workers make decisions solely.
Workers and managers decisions jointly.
We restrict the attention to the decision of daily or weekly planning of individual work because it is directly related to the everyday work of the employees irrespective of the business nature of the workplace. 2 We characterize the level of delegation in the workplace with variable delegate , which equals to 1 when workers can normally plan their daily or weekly work and 0 otherwise.
The major advantage of using this survey question to construct the outcome variables is that we can observe the allocation of decision rights between the managers and the workers: Workers have the highest level of decision authority when they can plan their own work and have the lowest level of decision authority when the work is planned by the managers, or decision authority is shared between managers and workers when they jointly make the work planning Bloom et al. (2013) 's ERP system and network system. We use them to proxy for the reductions in learning cost and communication cost inside the workplace and examine how they are related to decentralization.
Control Variables.
In the regression analysis, we include several control variables which may affect the workplace's decision to decentralize. First, we use log of number of employees to control for the effect of workplace size (Size) since larger workplaces or firms tend to decentralize (e.g., Bloom et al., 2013) . Second, we use the fraction of unionized workers (Union) to control for the potential effect of unions on productivity (e.g., DiNardo and Lee, 2004) within the workplace, i.e., the decision is made by either the workers or the managers (or both).
Thus, when the decision is made by someone external to the workplace, 9 or is neither decided internally nor externally, such a workplace is excluded. Excluding observations with missing information in the outcome variable and the other control variables, the regression sample consists of 12,328 workplace-year observations. and 8% of the time through solo decision. The latter pattern is similar to that in the data set of Bloom et al. (2013) in which workers usually do not have full decision rights.
Unitary Analysis
On the other hand, both ICT applications are commonly used by the workplaces in the sample:
database software is in use in over 80% of the cases, and communication system over 70%. In Table 1 also shows the correlations among the variables. We can see that the decentralization variable is positively related to both ICT use variables. But as will be discussed below, the (unconditional) positive correlation between the use of communication system and workers' decision rights becomes negative once unobserved workplace heterogeneity is controlled for in the regression.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In Table 2 , we compare the means of the variables by the adoption of the two ICT applications.
Columns (1) and (3) show the means of the variables for the workplaces that use database software and those that do not; and Columns (6) and (8) show the means of the variables for the workplaces that use communication system and those that do not. This table shows that there are significant differences between those workplaces using ICT and those not using: workplaces using database software or communication systems tend to (1) have more employees, (2) have a smaller fraction of unionized workers, (3) are "older," (4) have more innovations, (5) implement better HRM practices, and (6) face more competition. We can see that almost all of these differences are statistically significant. Thus one may be concerned about whether the workplaces using ICT and those not using ICT are systematically different along certain dimensions. In other words, endogeneity may exist in the two ICT use variables. If that is the case, then the regression results will be biased without proper control of the problem.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Econometric Specification
To examine how delegation of decision rights is related to the use of database software and communication system, I estimate the following workplace-level linear probability model: are the dummy variables indicating the use of database software and communication system respectively, X it contains other control variables defined earlier, i and t are the workplace and year fixed-effects respectively, and it is the error term. Based on the earlier discussion, we expect that decentralization is more likely when database software is used, and is less likely when communication system is used, i.e., 1 >0 and 2 <0. Table 3 reports the regression results of the regression in (Error! Reference source not found.).
Baseline Regression Results
In all the regressions, the observations are scaled by the sampling weights provided by Statistics Canada, and robust standard errors are reported. Model 1 in Table 3 reports a pooled cross-sectional, fixed effectsregression analysis by regressing the delegation dummy on the use of database software and communication system without any controls.
Our results show that delegation is positively associated with the use of database software but is negatively associated with the use of communication system. These results are consistent with our hypotheses.
As discussed earlier, there are other potentially important factors determining the extend of delegation in a firm . We include these factors in the baseline regression model as well to check whether the main results are driven by them. In Model 2, we include a measure of workplace size to control for the size effect. In Model 3, we include the fraction of unionized workers in the regression. In Model 4, we control for the workplace's age and the innovation introduced in the workplace. In Model 5, we include an index of the HRM practices in the regression. In Model 6, we control for the degree of product market competition faced by the workplace. Finally in Model 7, we include all the above covariates in the regression. In all these specifications, the coefficients of Database and Communication have the same signs as those in the baseline regression and are all statistically significant. Among the other control variables, the coefficients of the innovation index (ZInnovate) and the HRM practices index (ZHRM) are positive and statistically significant.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Focusing onModel 7 of Table 3 , we can see that effects of the two ICT variables on workers' decision rights are also economically significant. The marginal effects of the two ICT variables (calculated at the means of other variables) are as follows. When database software is used, the likelihood of decentralization increases by about 5.3%; when communication system is used, the likelihood decreases by about 4.2%. The two marginal effects are also similar in magitudes.
In particular, the sum of the coefficients of Database and Communication are not statistically different from zero (with F-statistic = 0.37 and p-value = 0.553), suggesting that when both database software and communication system are used within the workplace, the two opposing effects on decentralization cancel out and the organizational design of delegation in the workplace does not change.
Robustness Checks
Endogeneity and reverse causality
In the baseline regression, the right hand side variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term. However, endogeneity may exist because other factors not included in the regression may affect both the delegation in the workplace and the use of ICT applications or when ICT use depends on a particular organizational design of delegation. For example, when decision rights are delegated to the workers, the organization may require a communication system to facilitate the transmission of instructions from the top to the bottom. Part of the endogeneity problem is due to unobserved time-specific or workplace-specific factors which can be controlled for with a panel data set. Nevertheless, other time-varying factors may still exist and cause endogeneity.
One common method to deal with the endogeneity problem is to rely on an Instrumental Variable (IV) which is correlated with the endogenous variable but is uncorrelated with the error term. In practice, it may be difficult to find a valid instrument. Instead of finding an instrument, we try to deal with the problem by the Control Function method developed by Heckman and Robb (1985) . The basic idea of the Control Function method is to add a function in the regression model to "control" for the correlation between the potential endogenous variables and the error term. Once the control function is included in the regression, the new error term will no longer be correlated with the endogenous variables.
The Control Function method can be implemented in two stages. In the first stage, we use the Probit model to regress the ICT use dummy (either Database or Communication) on an excluded variable (which is not included in the baseline regression) and other control variables.
We then obtain the propensity score and construct the control function, denoted by CF it , as a polynomial of the propensity score. In the second stage, I include the control function as an extra covariate, i.e., we estimate:
In this regression, the control function CF it will control for the correlation between the potential endogenous variable (i.e., ICT it ) and the error term. The new error term it will now be uncorrelated with ICT it .
The excluded variable used in the Probit regression for the use of database software is the fraction of managerial and administrative workers in the workplace. The larger this fraction is, the workplace is more likely to be an administrative workplace (such as a head office or an accounting office) and use database software to store administrative records such as staff profile or financial information. The excluded variable used in the Probit regression for the use of communication system is the share of the workplace's sales in the international market.
Presumably workplaces with more international businesses should have more clients or suppliers around the world so that communication system is more likely to be installed in these workplaces. In each case, we require that the excluded variable is not related to the unobserved factors that affect decentralization when ICT is used and those unobserved factors that affect decentralization when ICT is not used. Table 4 reports the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) (1) and (2) show the regression results from the baseline linear probability models. In Column (3), I include a quadratic polynomial of the propensity score obtained from the Probit regression in Column (1) of Panel (A); in Column (4), I include a quadratic polynomial of the propensity score obtained from the Probit regression in Column (2) of Panel (A). 10 Note that the standard errors of the control function regressions in Columns (3) and (4) are corrected by bootstrapping (250 times).
In these two regressions, the coefficients of the two ICT variables are of expected signs and are still significant.
[Insert Table 4 
Other robustness checks
Alternative Specifications.The baseline regression is a linear probability model using a binary indicator of delegation as the dependent variable. We try two different specifications to check the robustness of the baseline results.
First, we estimate a panel data Probit model as an alternative regression model. Note that the estimation of this model is complicated by the "incidental parameters problem" in the sense that one cannot simply put in workplace fixed-effects in the Probit regression as in the linear probability model. To avoid this problem, we follow Wooldridge (2002) and impose additional identifying assumptions: we assume that the vector of the explanatory variables (including the unobserved year effects) is strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved workplace effects which follow a Chamberlain-type (1980) conditional Normal distribution. These two assumptions essentially transform the original regression model by "differencing out" the unobserved workplace fixed-effects, so that the resulting regression no longer depends on them.
In this case, the parameters can be consistently estimated by using a pooled Probit regression model of the outcome variable on a constant, the explanatory variables and their time averages.
The regression results, reported in Column (1) of Table 4 , show that the two ICT variables have the same signs as in the baseline regression model and are both statistically significant.
Second, we construct a slightly different outcome variable for regression analysis. Recall that in the raw data, we observe three different cases: (1) workers making decisions solely, (2) workers and managers making decisions jointly, and (3) managers making decisions solely. We define an ordinal variable to characterize the ranking of workers' decision rights: workers' level of decision rights is the highest when they make decisions solely and the lowest when managers make decisions solely. We use this 3-level categorical variable as the dependent variable and estimate a panel data ordered Probit model. Similar to the case for the panel data Probit model, the "incidental parameters problem" also exists in the panel data ordered Probit model estimation. We also follow Wooldridge (2002) and impose the same additional identifying assumptions to avoid the problem. The results of the panel data ordered Probit model, reported in Column (2) of Table 4 , are similar to the baseline results and are statistically significant.
11
11 Note also that while the 3-level categorical variable defined above is used as an ordinal variable to rank the levels of workers' decision rights under different scenarios, it may also be treated as a cardinal variable. For example, we can assume that workers have 0% of the decision rights when managers make decisions solely, 50% of the decision rights when workers and managers make decisions jointly, and 100% of the decision rights when workers make decisions solely. Then we may also estimate a panel data fractional Probit model.
Subsample Regressions.
We also estimate the baseline models with different subsamples. The results are reported in Models 3 to 6 of Table 5 . The regression sample in Model 3 excludes not-for-profit workplaces, and that in Model 4 excludes the smaller workplaces (with fewer than 20 employees). The not-for-profit workplaces may have a different decision structure than that in profit-making workplaces, and the small workplaces may not have the same need to use ICT as in larger workplaces. The regression results, based on linear probability models, show similar results as in the baseline model. In Models 5 and 6, the regression samples include the workplaces in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors respectively in the regression, 12 and these two regressions are panel data Probit model. 13 In all these regressions, we still find that decentralization is more likely when database software is used but is less likely when communication system is used. The results in Models 5 and 6 suggest that the baseline empirical patterns do not just appear in the manufacturing workplaces, but also in other types of workplaces.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we evaluate the distinct effects of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on the delegation of decision rights within an organization. This paper privides empirical
The estimation of a fractional Probit model is similar to that of a traditional Probit model except that the outcome variable is defined over the [0,1] interval rather than {0,1} only (see Papke and Wooldridge, 2008) . The regression results, not reported here, are also very similar. 12 The workplaces in the manufacturing sector are those in the "forestry, mining, oil, and gas extraction," "labour intensive tertiary manufacturing," "primary product manufacturing," "secondary product manufacturing," "capital intensive tertiary manufacturing," "construction," and "transportation, warehousing, wholesale" industries. The workplaces in the non-manufacturing sector are those in the "communication and other utilities," "retail trade and consumer services," "finance and insurance," "real estate, rental and leasing operations," "business services," "education and health services," and "information and cultural industries" industries. 13 Results using the linear probability model have expected signs but are not statistical significant at the 10% level.
support to the theory developed by Garicano (2000) which predicts that to the extent that the cost of acquiring production knowledge can be reduced by the use of database software and the cost of communication can be reduced by the use of communication systems, delegation is more likely when the former ICT application is used but is less likely when the latter application is used.
We use the longitudinal and nationally representative data from Statistics Canada's Workplace and Employee Survey to test these predictions and find supportive evidence. These findings also complement the cross-sectional evidence documented in Bloom et al. (2013) , who found an evidence for a similar theoretical argument at a different level of analysis. While Bloom et al. (2013) document the distinct effects of IT and CT on the delegation from headquarters to busienss units, we complement that evidence but showing that these relationships hold at the more granular level of delegation from manager to employee. An additional contribution arises from our robustness analysis which demonstrates that the mechanisms we test are present only only in manufacturing firms, but also in other types of workplaces in service industries. Overall, the empirical results reported in this paper advance our understanding on how the existing organizational theories apply in actual organizatons.
This paper not only complements the studies that investigate the distinct effects of IT and CM on delegation, but also contributes to the broader stream of liteature on organizational design.
We add to the litature on antecedents of delegation and on organizational practices that facilitate delegation and employee autonomy.
We are aware that delegation involves other tradeoffs such as balancing access to specialized knowledge which is distributed among individuals in a firm and the agency problems which arises from loss of control over delegated decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1992, Aghion and complementary to the focus on agency issues. Robust standard errors, clusteredat the industry level, are in parentheses. .*p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%
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